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LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO PROCEEDING
A complete list of all parties to this
proceeding in the lower court is contained in the caption
of the case upon appeal.

-iDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO PROCEEDING

*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ii
i i i

TABLE OF CITATIONS AND AUTHORITIES
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

...

1
1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STATEMENT OF FACTS

.....

2

ARGUMENT
3

POINT I
A.

THE NATURE OF THE CRIME
NEXUS TO VERACITY

B.

RECENTNESS OR REMOTENESS OF THE
PRIOR CONVICTION

C.

SIMILARITY OF PRIOR CRIME TO
CHARGED CRIME

D.

IMPORTANTANCE OF CREDIBILITY ISSUES
IMPORTANTANCE OF ACCUSED'S TESTIMONY
X1

POINT IA
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO TESTIFY

13

POINT II
MOTION TO SUPPRESS FIRST LINE-UP

17

CONCLUSION

i
-iiDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CITATIONS AND AUTHORITIES
Cases
Page
State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986)

5,7,8,9,10

State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987)

6,8,10,11

State v. Ramierez, 157 Utah Adv. Rpts. 10
(1991)
State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah App. 1991)

Statutory Provisions
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(3)(I)

-iiiDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14,15,17
6

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court
by Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-2(3)(i).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court commit error by

denying appellant's motion to exclude from evidence the
appellant's prior felony convictions?
2.

Did the trial court deny appellant due

process in failing to grant the appellant's motion to
suppress the eyewitness identification of appellant by
various witnesses?
3.

Did the trial court commit error by

refusing to grant appellant's motion for a mistrial on the
basis of jury misconduct?
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Section 76-6-302 (1953 as amended); Article I, Section
7 Utah Constitution
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 12, 1990, a jury convicted appellant
of aggravated robbery, a felony of the first degree, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-302. On October 5,
1990 the appellant was sentenced to serve a term of five
years to life in the Utah State Prison and to an additional
year firearm enhancement to run consecutively,
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(R.-00247)

On July 16, 1990 appellant was also convicted
on the habitual criminal enhancement allegations.

That

sentenced merged with the aggravated robbery sentence.
(R.-00245)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 18, 1989 a business known as Taco
Bell was robbed by a man with a ski mask covering his face.
On August 22, 1989, four days after the Taco
Bell robbery, four of the witnesses who testified at
defendant's trial were shown a group of six photographs, of
which defendant's photo was number four.

The original

description of the robber was a male with a mustache and
blue eyes.
Trista Valdez testified that only two men in
the photographs had blue eyes and these were the only two she
considered.

She identified number six, not the defendant.

(T. 52)
Randy Orvin identified the defendant in the
photo spread.

(T. 96)
Lance Ewing identified the defendant in the

photo spread.

(T. 156)
Jerod Stern picked number two and number four

in the photo spread.

(T.199)

On September 15, 1989 a line up was conducted
with seven participants.

Defendant Walker was in position

number four.

The four witnesses mentioned above

(Ex. S-41)

\
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were instructed that if they recognized the person who robbed
Taco Bell, to put the number in the box on the front of the
card.

They were instructed that if they believed they was

the robber but were not certain, they were to write the
number on the back of the card.

(Line-up Transcript p. 12)

Trista Valdez wrote nothing on the front and
number two on the back.
defendant.

(T. 13, 14)

She did not pick the

Jerod Stern wrote nothing on the front and number

four on the back.

Randy Orvin wrote nothing on the front

and number four on the back.

Lance Ewing wrote nothing on

the front and number four on the back.
On December 12, 1989 a second line-up was
conducted with eight men.

Defendant Walker was number two.

Jerod Stern, Trista Valdez and Lance Ewing were present.
The witnesses were instructed that if they could make a
positive identification they were to write the number in the
box on front of the card.

(Line-up Transcript, p. 13) All

of the men had masks covering their faces. All were
instructed to repeat the same statements.

The witnesses

were told that if they could make a probable or possible
identification to write the number on the back of the card.
(Line-up Transcript, p. 18)
Lance Ewing wrote a zero on the front and
nothing on the back.

Trista Valdez wrote nothing on the

front and number seven on the back.

Jerod Stern wrote

-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

nothing on the front and number two on the back.

(Line-up

Transcript, p. 18)
The men in the line-up were then told to leave
the roomf remove their masks and come back in. A short
recess was taken in which defendant Walker requested his
attorney to object to the mask being removed.

(Line-up

Transcript, p. 19) No such objection was made by his
attorney.

The witnesses were told if they could not make

a positive identification to put a zero on the front of the
card.

They were told that if they recognized someone to put

that person's number on the back of the card.

(Line-up

Transcript, p. 21)
Trista Valdez put zero on the front of the
card and number two on the back.

Lance Ewing put zero on

the front and nothing on the back.

Jerod Stern put number

two on the front and nothing on the back.

(Line-up Tran-

script, p. 21 ) .
On December 13, 1989 Trista Valdez and Jerod
Stern testified at a preliminary hearing at which the
defendant was present.

Stern identified the defendant.

(T. 208-209)
At the trial Trista Valdez was unable to
positively identify the defendant as the robber.

(T. 69)

Randy Orvin identified the defendant at trial as the robber.
(T. 90).

Lance Ewing identified the defendant at trial

as the robber.

Jerod Stern identifed the defendant at

trial as the robber.
-4-
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POINT I
The defendant filed a motion under U.R.E.
609 to preclude the state from presenting evidence at trial
of prior convictions of the defendant.

The court, on

April 23, 1990 held a hearing on the motion and ruled that
the 1982 robbery conviction and a 1981 deadly weapon
conviction were admissible in evidence.
"It is punishable by more than a year
imprisonment. It is less than 10 years
old. Although it is somewhat prejudicial, it
is same-the same kind of crime as this one, I
find the prejudicial effect is not outweighed
by the probative value. The robbery charge of
December 1982 will be admitted. That's also
true of the deadly weapon charge of February
1981. Again that's punishable by more than a
year in prison. It is less than 10 years old
and is admissible under 6009, as I understand
it, unless I find that prejudicial effect
outweighs the probative value, which I don't so
in summary, those two convictions, the two
felonies, will be admitted. (Motion Hearing T.
14-15).
In May of 1990 the defendant filed an
1
objection

to the above ruling of the court and cited

additional arguments in support of exclusion of the two
felony convictions, especially the case of State v. Banner,
717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986).

There was no change in the

court's original ruling allowing the felony convictions.
1.

The objection refers to "two 1988 robbery convictions"
These two convictions, if they exist, were not considered
by the court and were not mentioned in the court's ruling
of April 23, 1990.
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On July 12, 1990 after the state had rested
and prior to the conclusion of the defendant's case in
chief, the defendant, on advice of counsel, decided not to
testify in his own behalf.
ARGUMENT
THE TWO PRIOR FELONY CONVICTIONS OF THE
DEFENDANT WERE INADMISSIBLE UNDER UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 609
Rule 609(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence
Provides:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of
attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime
shall be admitted if elicited from him or
established by public record during cross=
examination but only if the crime, (1) was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year under the law under which he was
convicted, and the court determines that the x
probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
defendant, or (1) involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment.
In the instant case, the two felony
convictions were found admissible under subsection one.
In State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah App.
1988) the Court of Appeals defined the standard of review
applicable in this case as follows:
"In reviewing evidentiary rulings, we 'will
not reverse the trial court's ruling on
evidentiary issues unless it is manifest that
the court so abused its discretion that there
is a likelihood that injustice resulted.'"
State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah
1987). Wight at 16.
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It is defendant's position that the ruling
of the trial court was clearly erroneous and the effect of
the ruling in essentially coercing the defendant into
relinquishing his right to testify in his own behalff
created a great likelihood that injustice resulted.
In State v. Bannery supra, this court delineated the factors to be considered in evaluating the
admissibility of evidence under subsection one of Rule 609.
Those factors are:
(1) the nature of the crime, as bearing on
the character for veracity of the witness.
(2) the recentness or remoteness of the prior
conviction...
(3) the similarity of the prior crime to the
charge crime, insofar as a close resemblance
may lead the jury to punish the accused as a
bad person.
(4) the importance or credibility issues in
determining the truth in a prosecution trial
without decisive non-testimonial evidence...
(5) the importance of the accused's testimony
as perhaps warranting the exclusion of
convictions probative of the accused's
character for veracity...
In arriving at a ruling on the admissibility
of the 1982 deadly weapon conviction, it does not appear
that the court weighed any of the Banner factors.

The court

dealt only with the more than one year issue and whether the
probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect.
If the court had conducted an inquiry into the
factors set forth in Bannery supray it seems clear that both
of the prior convictions should have been ruled inadmissible.
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A.
THE NATURE OF THE CRIME - NEXUS TO VERACITY.
In Bannery supra, the court held that the
crime of assault with intent to commit rape did not
inherently reflect on defendant's character for truth and
veracity.

In State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987)

the court held:
"The crime of rape does not inherently
reflect on defendant's character for truth and
veracity... likewise, the convictions for
escape should have been excluded because of...
the complete lack of connection between the
crime of escape and defendant's veracity." at
Under Banner and Gentry, supra, the
convictions of robbery and deadly weapon have a complete
lack of connection to the defendant's veracity.
B . •

RECENTNESS OR REMOTENESS OF THE PRIOR CONVICTION.
In this case, the two convictions were eight
and nine years old at the time of trial.

In Banner, supra,

the court stated:
"Particularly significant in our balancing
process is the remoteness of the prior
convictions...the convictions at the time
of defendant's trial were between eight and
nine plus years old." at 1335
In Gentry, supra, the court stated:
"The rape conviction
time of this trial.
ness is a measure of
value." at
3307

was ten years old at the
The conviction's remoteits negligible probative
.
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c.
THE SIMILARITY OF THE PRIOR CRIME TO THE
CHARGED CRIMEr INSOFAR AS A CLOSE RESEMBLANCE MAY LEAD THE
JURY TO PUNISH THE ACCUSED AS A BAD PERSON.
In this case, the defendant was convicted
of aggravated robbery, with the use of a gun.

The two

felonies admitted are almost identicalr i.e. robbery and
possession of a dangerous weaponf to the crime charged.
In Bannery supray wherein the defendant was
charged with sodomy on a child and sexual abuse of a child,
the court stated:
"The convictions were for assault with
intent to commit rape. Such convictions
would be extremely prejudicial and tend to
inflame the jury in any case dealing with
sexual crimes..." at 1335
The defendant would submit that the two
convictions in his case were even more similar than were the
Banner convictions and therefore more prejudicial.
D.
THE IMPORTANCE OF CREDIBILITY ISSUES IN
DETERMINING THE TRUTH IN A PROSECUTION TRIED WITHOUT DECISIVE
NON-TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE.
AND
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ACCUSED'S TESTIMONY,
AS PERHAPS WARRANTING THE EXCLUSION OF CONVICTIONS PROBATIVE
OF THE ACCUSED'S CHARACTER FOR VERACITY.
It seems appropriate to discuss factors four
and five together in this particular case. The reason being

-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that they essentially merge together.
In this case the decisive evidence was the
various eyewitnesses identification testimony.

There was

essentially no decisive non-testimonial evidence.

In

addition there were no convictions probative of the
defendant's character for veracity to exclude. What is left
then of factors four and fivef are (1) the importance of
credibility issues in determining the truth; and (2) the
importance of the accused's testimony.
The teachings of Banner and Gentry are equally
applicable to this case where the only credible evidence to
offer against the eyewitnesses testimony would have been the
testimony of Thayne Walker.
In Banner, supra, the court noted:
"Finally, the accused's testimony and the
importance of credibility in this case were
critical in determining which version of the
facts was correct since the prosecutor's
case included no decisive non-testimonial
evidence." at 1335 .
In Gentryy supra, the court observed:
"Finally, the State relied upon the
testimonial evidence offered by the victim
to establish the defendant's guilt.
Defendant's testimony would have been
probative regarding the victim's credibility
and possibly influential in the trial's
outcome." at 1037-38.
In summary, it is the position of the
defendant that based on the balancing test prescribed by
-10-
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i

Banner, supra, the prior convictions should have been
excluded.
POINT IA
THE DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO TESTIFY SHOULD
NOT BE CONSIDERED A WAIVER OF THE RULE 609 ISSUE.
It seems clear that the law in Utah as set
forth in Gentry, supra, is that in order to preserve a
defendant's objection to a Rule 609 ruling, a defendant
must in fact testify.
However, in this case, appellant Walker would
submit that such a failure should not be deemed a waiver.Walker's position is that his decision to not testify was a
result of a combination of inaccurate advice by both his
counsel and the trial judge.
At the end of the defendant's case in chief,
the following discussion took place between the court,
counsel and the defendant:
Judge Daniels: And other than that do you have any
other witnesses?
Ms. Bowman:

I don't believe we do, your Honor.

And I should indicate that Mr. Donaldson and I and
Thayne have talked at length about his right to testify
and indicated to him that he has an absolute right to
testify.

We both advised him not to testify based upon

what's come in and what we have argued.

And I believe

he's willing to accept and follow that advice.
-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

He

certainly was concerned about testifying to
preserve the 609 issue. And that's a concern
as ours as wellf but I think that given your
ruling on the 609 issue that would be very,
very risky.
Judge Daniels: All right.

You understand then,

Mr. Walker, you do have a right to testify.
Mr. Walker:

Yes, I do.

Judge Daniels: And you also have a right not to
testify.

And you have the choice to make and you have

chosen not to under the circumstances; is that right?

•

*

Mr. Walker: Right.
Judge Daniels: Now, I understand, and I guess
the record should clearly reflect, that one of the
reasons that you've made that decision is because of my
ruling on the question of whether prior convictions
could be brought up.

And your attorneys, of course,

have objected to my ruling on that and established on
the record at considerable length, and also in a motion
to reconsider, that you object to that.

And I under-

stand that your decision is based, in part, on that
ruling and that's preserved for appeal.
Does that sufficiently cover that, Ms. Bowman?
Ms. Bowman:

I guess I should add, its our opinion

that the case law would probably require him to testify

i
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spread

and the two lineups. This motion was based on the theory
that the three identification procedures were unnecessarily
suggestive and a violation of the defendant's due process
rights.

The motion also attacked the reliability of the

procedures and resulting identification.
On May 16, 1990 the appellant, through his
attorneys, filed another motion to suppress the results
of the identification procedures.

The basis of the motion

as that the procedures employed were unduly suggestive in
violation of Article I
(R.-00050)

Section 7 of the Utah Constitution.

On May 22, 1990 the court, in a minute entry,

based on the arguments of counsel and the defendant, denied
the motion to suppress.
The trial court made no factual findings and
the only legal conclusions were that the motions be denied.
It is the contention of the appellant that
he was denied due process when the prosecution was allowed to
introduce the identification of him as the gunman.

It is

appellant's contention that the circumstances surrounding the
identification rendered it totally unreliable.

The defendant

further contends that (1) the trial court did not conduct an
analysis of the circumstances of the identification as is
required by State v. Ramierez,

157 Utah Adv. Rpts. 10 (1991)

and (2) such an analysis of the procedures employed and the
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the

D.

Was the witnesses1 identification made

spontaneouslyf did it remain consistent thereafter,
or was it a product of suggestion.
Although the witnesses did not see the
gunman's facef they describe him as having blue eyes and a
mustache.

In the photographic array only two of the

photos had blue eyesf one of these being the defendant.
Approximately one montht after the robbery the
witnesses observed a lineup involving seven men with masks.
The defendant was the only man from the photo spread
participating in the lineup.

None of the witnesses could

positively identify any of the seven as being the robber.
(Ex. S-3-56)
Approximately two months after the first lineup
another lineup was held with eight men. Again the
defendant was the only man from the photo spread.

With the

mask on, none of the three witnesses could positively
identify the defendant.

(Ex. S-10-5-13)

Only one, Jarold

Stern indicated the defendant as possibly being the robber.
(Ex. S-13)

After the masks were removed only Stern was able

to positively identify the defendant.

(Ex. S-14)

Valdez

indicated on the back of the card that the defendant was
someone she recognized.

(Ex. S-12)

It is defendant's contention that (1) having
only two men with blue eyes in the photographic array limited
the reliable choices of the witnesses and (2) that it was
suggestive in the extreme to have two lineups, each with
-16Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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requests that the court reverse his conviction and remand
the matter for a new trial.
DATED this

day of Novemberf 1991.

STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing to the office of
the Attorney General for the State of Utah, 236 State Capitol
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this

day of

November, 1991.
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